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Police Discretion in the
21st Century Surveillance State
Tom Tylert

I. INTRODUCTION

This analysis discusses changes in policing that could help build
popular legitimacy, i.e. public trust and confidence in the police. The
low level of public trust, especially in minority communities, has been
the focus of recent national attention in the wake of a series of deaths
during public contact with the police. This analysis will focus on three
potential areas of change: the style of policing, the scope of policing, and
the organization of policing. The style of policing refers to how the
police deal with the public; the scope of policing focuses on who the
police deal with in the streets and in cars; and the organization of
policing is concerned with the internal dynamics of police departments.
The premise underlying these arguments is that we are at a pivotal
moment in policing-a time when police leaders, federal law
enforcement officials, and the general public are focused on legitimacy
as an important issue in policing. I accept the premise of the report,
President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, that building public
trust and confidence is a desirable goal, and focus on finding ways to
achieve it.'
What is legitimacy? The focus of this paper is upon popular
legitimacy; the public view that police officers are entitled to direct
people's actions because they exercise authority on behalf of the
community. It is appropriate for them to make decisions about how to
resolve conflicts and enforce rules, and people have an obligation to
defer to them and comply with their directives. From this perspective,
t

Macklin Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale Law School.
' See generally OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015) (hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE); see also POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM:
RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 2 (Apr.

2016),
https:#chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF
[https://perma.cc/4SLF-MV4K].
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legitimacy involves people's evaluations and judgments about the
police. In studies of the public, legitimacy is typically measured using
one or more of three interrelated public evaluations: having trust and
confidence in the police; feeling obligated to accept and follow police
directives; and believing that the police and the public share values
concerning the boundaries of appropriate public behavior within the
community.
However, my concern is with the types of changes in policing that
can enshrine legitimacy within the overall framework through which
policing is understood in the twenty-first century. My own role is as an
empirical scientist, so I will focus on changes that are supported by
research findings as part of a broader effort to promote evidence-based
law and legal policy. 2 I will particularly emphasize the findings of my
own research, since a broader overview of findings in the field is
already available. 3 In addition to talking about immediate policy
recommendations for changing policing today, I use the current
discussion about policing to highlight how recent discussions about
proactive policing highlight a more general move in the United States
toward a surveillance society in which the behavior of citizens is widely
scrutinized and examined by law enforcement officials.
In earlier eras, law enforcement authorities viewed their primary
responsibility as involving investigating already committed crimes and
prosecuting people apprehended and viewed as the likely involved
criminals. This model of policing is nicely captured in the popular
homicide bureau slogan "our day begins when your day ends."
Similarly, most crime dramas begin with at least one body in their first
five minutes, followed by efforts to solve the crime by arresting and
convicting the perpetrators. In contrast to this traditional and
fictionalized world of criminal justice, the police in America have
pioneered the idea of proactive policing to prevent crimes. This includes
general preventive interventions directed toward those the police
suspect of being current or likely future lawbreakers, as well as
focusing particular attention on people or places suspected of being
likely sources of criminal activity. I suggest that these policing efforts
to control violent crime have gradually expanded to a general
"surveillance state" in which government authorities, motivated by the
laudable mission of preventing violent crimes and terrorist acts, have
increasingly disregarded the idea that people are entitled to be free of
government interference in their activities absent specific evidence that

See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
See generally Tom R. Tyler et al., The Impact of Psychological Science on Policing in the
United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law Enforcement,16 PSYCHOL. SC.
PUB. INT. 75 (2015).
2
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they are or about to be engaged in criminal activity (i.e. "reasonable"
grounds for suspicion).
Such proactive approaches are increasingly married with
predictive technologies. These technologies allow criminal justice
authorities to predict the future behavior of people based upon criterion
ranging from their past actions to their demographic characteristics. 4
The consequences of this development has been the minimization of the
centrality of another important legal concept: that people are presumed
innocent until they have and have been shown in an appropriate legal
forum to have committed illegal acts.
My general argument is that, while the more extreme examples of
proactive policing such as the policy of stopping large groups of the
general population for questioning and searches based upon thin or
even nonexistent legal pretexts may be in retreat, the more broadly
conceived surveillance state is flourishing. This flourishing raises
questions about the ability of traditional legal concepts to effectively
restrain modern criminal justice systems to maintain the balance of
state interests and individual rights originally envisioned in our
Constitution.
A.

Crime Rates, Police Professionalism, and Popular Legitimacy

It is striking that improvements in police professionalism and
declines in crime rates have not raised the level of police legitimacy
within American communities.5 As a consequence, there is a need to a
focus on better understanding how to create and sustain legitimacy.
The President's Task Force on 21st Policingrefers to police legitimacy as
the "First Pillar" of effective policing. 6 This legitimacy frame, once
initially articulated, shapes discussion of all the other Pillars of policing
outlined in the report.7
In contrast to this recent focus on legitimacy, prior discussions of
policing have been concerned with two issues: crime control and police
professionalism. Crime control is a core issue in policing. During the
1970s and 1980s, when violent drug related crime was widespread, it
became a central preoccupation of police leaders.8 This was so much the
See Jack Smith IV, 'Minority Report' is Real-And it's Really Reporting Minorities,
MIc.coM (Nov. 9, 2015), https: /mic.com/articles/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policingtechnology-is-really-reporting-minorities#.mecIpnvjy [https://perma.cc/A8QD-7CL2].
See Tyler et al., supra note 3, at 96.
6

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 9.

Id. (stating that trust and legitimacy are foundational to the whole inquiry of the
taskforce).
8 See John N. Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States, The War on Crime: The End
of the Beginning, Address Before the Attorney Generals Conference on Crime Reduction, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME REDUCTION (Sept. 9, 1971), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
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case that many policing policies have been evaluated solely in terms of
their ability to deter crime without any consideration of whether they
have a broader impact on the community. For many departments,
crime reduction has become an end in itself in terms of justifying police
actions. At the same time, issues of corruption and unprofessional
conduct have been important concerns in the move toward
professionalization in policing. 9 These preoccupations have been
productive because there is evidence that the police have made
10
substantial progress in recent decades on both of these fronts.
The reductions in crime and increases in police professionalism
stand in contrast to unchanging levels of popular legitimacy. In 1993,
fifty-two percent of adult Americans expressed "a great deal" or "quite a
lot" of confidence in the police in their community and in 2014 the
percentage was fifty-three percent." Further, there has been a large
race-based gap in trust, and that gap continues to this day. In 2014,
sixty percent of White Americans expressed confidence in their local
police, while forty percent of African Americans expressed such
confidence (in 1993 the numbers were forty-seven percent and thirtythree percent). 12 This racial gap has been an important factor in
13
disputes about issues such as racial profiling. It has recently been
starkly revealed in different reactions to police shootings of civilians
among African Americans and whites. Minority group members are less
likely to trust the police to explain events honestly, to investigate
wrongdoing transparently and impartially, or to be motivated to help
14
people in their communities.
While there has been considerable public attention to issues of
15
the
public trust and confidence in the police in the last year,
default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/09-09-197l.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ9G-VJFH].
9 See SAM WALKER, WHAT A GOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT LOOKS LIKE: PROFESSIONAL,
ACCOUNTABLE, TRANSPARENT, SELF-MONITORING 2 (2014) (self-published guide) (on file with The

University of Chicago Legal Forum).
1o

COMMITTEE TO REVIEW RESEARCH ON POLICE POLICY AND PRACTICES, FAIRNESS AND

EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 1-11 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Fryd1 eds., 2004).
Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP: POLITICS (June
[https://perma.
19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx
cc/994R-VGAK].
12
Justin McCarthy, Nonwhites Less Likely to Feel Police Protect and Serve Them, GALLUP:
POLITICS (November 17, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179468/nonwhites-less-likely-feelpolice-protect-serve.aspx [https://perma.cc/GT7H-9YGU].
13 Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice,
Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 276-77 (2004).
14 Walter Katz, EnhancingAccountability and Trust with Independent Investigationsof Police
Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 235, 236-37 (2015) (stating that minorities fill out the most
complaints against police and only nineteen percent of African Americans trust police to
investigate police-involved incidents).
15
Cheryl K. Chumley, Public Trust in Police Low, Criticism of Militarization Rises: Poll,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2014),
26,
(Aug.
TIMES
WASH.
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importance of legitimacy is not a new idea. The value of legitimacy
emerged from research conducted over the last several decades. 16
Studies have shown that legitimacy is related to deference to decisions
made by legal authorities.1 7 Many of the police-citizen encounters that
have led to high visibility police shootings began in resistance and
anger toward the police in everyday encounters.1 8 If people in the
community have greater trust in the police, these conflicts are less
likely to begin and escalate into resistance and physical violence. 19
However justified the police use of force might be in a given situation, it
is better if the encounter never becomes one in which questions of force
arise.
Legitimacy is also linked to the broad acceptance of police
authority. 20 The goal of having a police force is for people to refer issues
involving conflict with others or rule enforcement to government
authorities rather than engaging in interpersonal conflict with others
in the community. To most effectively maintain order, the police need
serious grievances and conflicts to be brought to their attention rather
than being handled privately by people in the community. While it may
be better for everyday conflicts with coworkers or neighbors to be
handled informally, conflicts that are serious enough to be long-term in
scope or to lead to spirals of private retaliatory violence benefit from
police intervention. For the police to do this effectively, people need to
feel that they can bring problems to the attention of the police.

20 14/aug/26/public-trust-police-low-poll-finds/
[https:lperma.cc/65RB-N2B7];
Emily Brown,
Timeline: Michael Brown Shooting in Ferguson, Mo., USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2015),
http: /www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/14/michael-brown-ferguson-missouri-

timeline/14051827/ [https: /perma.cc/KE5Z-ASBV].
16
See generally Tyler et al., supra note 3, for a review.
" TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 58-75 (Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, Margaret Levi eds., 2002);

Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men's
Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 753 (2014).
" See POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING
TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 2-4 (Apr. 2016),

https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATFFinalReport_4_13_16-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SLF-MV4K].
19
Tyler et al., supra note 3, at 84 (stating that police legitimacy decreases the willingness of
the public to engage in riots or rebellions); Kurtis Alexander, Police Often Provoke Protest Violence,
UC Researchers Find, SFGATE (Aug. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/HR8TWT68.
20 JONATHAN JACKSON ET AL., JUST AUTHORITY? TRUST IN THE POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

213-14 (2013); Jonathan Jackson et al., Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public
Attitudes Toward the Acceptability of Violence, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, AND L. 479, 479 (2013);
Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of ProceduralJustice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public
Support for Policing, 37 L. & Soc'Y REV. 513, 529 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson,
PopularLegitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and
Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y AND L. 78, 89 (2014).
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2 1
Legitimacy is further linked to everyday compliance with the laW
and to cooperation with the police. 22 It has been increasingly recognized
that the relationship between the police and the community influences
the general climate of engagement with neighbors, jobs, and
government. 23 These various studies demonstrate that the police have a
lot to gain from building popular legitimacy. Many of the problems that
the police identify as making policing more difficult-such as
widespread disregard of police authority and a broad unwillingness to
work with the police, are linked to a lack of trust and confidence in the
police-so building legitimacy is a desirable strategy for addressing
those problems.
Now is the time for addressing the problem of police legitimacy.
There are currently low rates of violent crime in major cities, and crime
24
rates have been declining for the last several decades. Despite some
comments by political leaders, evidence continues to suggest that crime
rates are low, and suggestions of crime increases are not supported
statistically. 2 5 Further, irrespective of contemporary fluctuations in
crime rates, it is impossible to compare current crime issues to the
26
1980-90s, since current rates are so much lower.
In addition, legitimacy is an issue because recent public events
have highlighted the question of trust for both local police leaders and
in federal authorities. As an example, recently a group of American
27
police chiefs came together to advocate for change in policing. Their
statement outlining needed reforms in criminal justice echoes the
themes of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, which

Jonathan Jackson et al., Why do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the
21
Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1062 (2012); Sunshine & Tyler,
supra note 20, at 529; TYLER, supra note 2, at 170; Tom R. Tyler et al., The Consequences of Being
an Object of Suspicion: PotentialPitfalls of ProactivePolice Contact, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
602, 613 (2015).
22 Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police
Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 262 (2008); Tyler & Jackson, supra
note 20, at 89.
23
Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Legitimacy: Policing in the USA and Europe, 8 EUR. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 254, 262 (2011); Tyler & Jackson, supra note 20, at 89.
24
See Jennifer L. Truman & Lynn Langton, Criminal Victimization, 2014, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Aug. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34XN-SMKE].
2
Matthew Friedman et al., Crime in 2015: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 2015 BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. 12.

Ian Simpson, FBI: Violent Crime Drops, Reaches 1970s Level, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 10, 2014
26
http:I/www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-violent-crime-1970s-levelPM),
2:25
20141110-story.html [https://perma.ccl8NPX-PBCS].
27
130 Top Police Chiefs and Prosecutors Urge End to Mass Incarceration,BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Oct. 21, 2015), https: //www.brennancenter.org/press-release/130-top-police-chiefs-andprosecutors-urge-end- mass-incarceration

xul].

[https://perma.ccfT9P8-PH
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agencies and the

II. STYLE OF POLICING
Discussions of policing emphasize the broad discretion that police
officers have to manage their interactions with the public. 29 While past
discussions focus on police discretion concerning whether to cite or
arrest people, officers have equally broad discretion concerning how
they treat the members of the public with whom they deal, i.e. whether
they are respectful, whether they explain their decisions, etc. While it
is important for the police to be lawful and to be effective, this article
presents reasons why it is also important that they treat members of
the community in ways that those people regard as being fair.
There is no constitutional right to be treated with courtesy, respect
or dignity by government officials, just as people are not entitled to
receive particular outcomes. Constitutional models focus on the
appropriate level of evidence that justifies each stage of contact with
the police, i.e. stops, frisks, arrests, and the use of various levels of
force all the way up to deadly force. 30 The police frame their actions in
terms of the Constitution and ask if they are entitled to legally engage
in particular actions. They frequently do so instead of asking if their
actions promote desirable goals, such as trust in the community. 31
Actions can be legal but still undesirable when viewed against the goal
of building community trust.
A.

Evaluating the police

During the 1970s the police developed the view, now widely shared
both by political leaders and by many in the public, that they should be
held accountable not just for solving past crimes but also for preventing
future crimes. 32 This belief is influenced by law enforcement's
expectation that people view the police instrumentally and thus people
will respond to favorable outcomes, such as reductions in the crime

28

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note
1, at 1.

See, e.g., Brett G. Stoudt, Michelle Fine & Madeline Fox, Growing Up Policed
in the Age of
Aggressive PolicingPolicies, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2011).
30 See Tyler et al., supra note 17, at 752-55.
3' See, e.g., Amy Lavalley, Porter Officials: County Complies With DUI Warrants, CHI. TRIB.
(June 22, 2016 4:41 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptbsupreme-blood-warrant-st-0625-20 160624-story.html [https://perma.cc/8G2G-BNGL]
(reporting
that county police officials continued to frame their breathalyzer tests as constitutional after
29

recent Supreme Court ruling).
32 Mitchell, supra note 8, at 3, 10-11; Tyler
et al., supra note 3, at 77.
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rate. 33 In particular, the police generally believe that their evaluations
by the public are linked largely or even completely to their ability to
deliver services or control the nature and frequency of crime. 34
A consequence of this focus on crime and crime control is that the
police have developed strategies designed to best combat crime. To do
this, they adopted a managerial style in which they concentrate
resources within internal police hierarchies which are organized in a
command and control, or quasi-military, framework and which
determine policies and practices for policing within communities. 35
Those policies and practices have then been deployed into communities
through displays of threat, the use of force, and other sanctions. The
core characteristic of policing thinking is the assumption that the
professional knowledge of the police makes police officers best able to
decide how and when to deploy police resources so as to most effectively
control crime. To prevent crime, the police have moved proactively to
search widely for guns and drugs, and to generally communicate fear of
rule breaking through the salience of risk of identification,
citation/arrest, and potential punishment.
A large body of social science research has accumulated which
shows that irrespective of whether this model of management is
effective in reducing crime, it is misaligned with the basis of police
legitimacy. 36 When people evaluate the police either in personal
encounters with officers or when considering the general policies and
practices of the police in their neighborhood, their central focus is not
on the crime rate or the lawfulness of the police,3 7 but on whether or
not the police exercise their authority in just ways. The public focuses
on this issue both when policies are being developed 38 and when they
are being implemented. 39 This is the issue of procedural justice.
Studies further demonstrate that judgments of procedural justice
include assessments of the fairness of decision-making and the fairness

" Joel B. Plant & Michael S. Scott, Effective Policing and Crime Prevention: A ProblemOriented Guide for Mayors, City Managers, and County Executives, 2009 U.S. DEP'T JUST. OFF.
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES 18-19.

*

Malcolm K. Sparrow, Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization, 2015 U.S.

DEP'T OF JUST., NATL INST. OF JUST., NEW PERSP. IN POLICING BULL., 5.
6

David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism, 2011 U.S. DEP'T OF

JUST., NAT'L INST. OF JUST., NEW PERSP. IN POLICING BULL., 3-4.
16 Tyler, supra note 23, at 170; Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits
of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 318 (2009); see generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY

PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS (2011); Tyler et al., supra note 3, at 77.
3
Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople View Good Policing, J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2016).
Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A
3
Study of Muslim Americans, 44 L. & SOC'Y REV. 365, 386 (2010).
' Tyler et al., supra note 17, at 775.
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of the treatment that people receive from the police. 40 Decision-making
involves allowing opportunities for participation and voice, and
providing evidence that decision-making is neutral, impartial, and
unbiased by using transparent procedures to make decisions. Quality of
treatment focuses on issues of courtesy and respect in interpersonal
treatment and evidence of trustworthiness through signs of benevolent
and caring motivations. Recognition and acknowledgement of people's
needs and concerns is a primary mechanism for communicating
trustworthy motives. 41
While all of these aspects of policing matter, the degree to which
people believe they experience respect frequently emerges as the
central issue when people deal with the police. Studies of the police, for
example, have found that citizen complaints are dominated by concerns
about disrespect, discourtesy, and demeaning or harassing treatment
by police officers. 42
Studies not only point to the central role that procedural justice in
decision-making and treatment plays in shaping judgments of police
legitimacy, but they also indicate that the degree to which people feel
that they receive fairness from the police shapes whether people
respond to the police deferentially, as opposed to with hostility and
defiance. 43 And, when people generalize from a personal experience to
overall legitimacy judgments, procedural justice is the key issue they
consider. 44 On this general level, legitimacy judgments shape important
public behaviors, including compliance and cooperation with the
police. 45
Given the centrality of civilian concerns about fairness-and
especially about fair treatment-the widespread reports about
harassment, disrespect, and demeaning and prejudiced behavior on the
part of the police 4 6 suggest that officers do not understand the impact of
their behavior on trust and confidence in the police. It suggests that the
police do not view trust and confidence as an issue that they should be

40 See id.; Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-ComponentModel of ProceduralJustice:
Defining the Meaning of a "Fair"Process, 29 PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 756

(2003).
41
42

Tyler, supra note 23, at 255-56.
Katz, supra note 14, at 236 (stating that in 2013, fifty-three percent of all police complaints

were for physical force misconduct).

4

Tyler & Fagan, supra note 22, at 263; Tyler & Huo, supra note 17, at 59-75.
TYLER & HUO, supra note 17, at 90-91; Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming,
Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders' Psychological Mechanisms in
the CanberraRISE Drinking-and-DrivingExperiment, 41 L. & SOc'Y REV. 553, 572 (2007).
4
See generally Tyler et al., supra note 17.
4 Jennifer Fratello et al., Coming of Age with Stop and Frisk: Experiences, Self-Perceptions,
and Public Safety Implications, 2013 VERA INST. OF JUST. 89-90; Stoudt et al., supra note 29, at
1361; Tyler et al., supra note 17, at 775.
44
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concerned about when they do their jobs. However, research suggests
that the impact of such experiences upon members of the public is
significant. Jeffery Fagan, Amanda Geller, and I demonstrate an
impact of police unfairness upon young men in New York City. 4 7 We
find that unfairness lowers legitimacy, promotes criminal behavior, and
lowers the willingness to cooperate with the police. 4 8 Amanda Geller,
Jeffery Fagan, Bruce G. Link, and I extend these findings and
demonstrate that unfair treatment is associated with the development
of mental health symptoms such as post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) .49
Unfairness
undermine legitimacy?
does unfairness
Why
undermines the relational bonds between people and authorities.5 0
Studies demonstrate this influence of shared social bonds by directly
measuring the social bond the public feels with the police and showing
that it mediates the influence of judgments about procedural justice
upon perceptions of police legitimacy.5 1 They consider whether people
trust police motives, whether they are proud of the police (e.g. think
they are honest, etc.), and whether they believe that the police respect
them, their values, and their lifestyle. These studies find that when
people feel that the police communicate suspicion of wrongdoing and
treat them like "criminals," this undermines their connection with the
police. Proactive police stops, particularly of those who are not involved
in criminal activity, communicate mistrust and suspicion on the part of
the police; harassment and disrespect directly express marginality and
suspect character. 52
It should be further noted that the repeated stopping of people who
are not engaged in illegal behavior, however fairly the police treat those
people, communicates the same sense of marginality and suspect
character. For example, studies of police interactions with young men
find that the number of stops is itself a predictor of assessments of
legality and procedural justice, with more frequently stopped civilians
rating their stops as less legal and more unfair. 5 3 In other words, after
repeated experience, people evaluate their stops not in their own terms
but as part of a larger policy and practice that is itself unfair. 5 4
See generally Tyler et al., supra note 17.
Id. at 775.
* Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 2324 (2014).
" Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model ofAuthority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 133-37 (1992).
Tyler et al., supra note 21, at 602.
61
62
Id. at 631.
4

a

3
5

See Tyler et al., supra note 17, at 775-76.
CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP
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These results suggest that one important source of improvement
for the police can come through reframing their goals to include
evaluating their actions in terms of their impact on popular legitimacy.
For example, departments can interview people who have had
experiences with particular officers to determine their views about the
police and/or through interviews with random samples of people in the
community with the same goal. When formulating and implementing
policies, the police need to focus on how their actions are understood by
civilians. This approach has been used in police departments such as
the Chicago Police Department, which developed a model of
RespectStat to parallel CompStat55 , which has focused primarily on
crime rates. 56 The idea is to track changes in police legitimacy, reward
officers who build legitimacy, and provide an alternative to an exclusive
focus on crime rates.
B.

Policing as Social Control

This argument is important, even if the goals of the police are
broader than crime control. Bradford and Loader suggest that the
police also serve the function of maintaining order in an unequal and
biased social and economic system by intimidating and dominating
marginal populations.5 7 This would explain the widespread reports of
harassment and similar approaches designed to generate fear of the
police. It is difficult to understand the pattern of disrespect and
humiliation reported by minority group members at the hands of the
police through a rational theory of crime control. For example, the
police almost never find guns or drugs when they search people, so
broad searching is difficult to regard as an effective tool of crime
suppression.58
To the extent that the police are, in reality, agents of social control
for an unjust society, this places limits on the degree to which the
arguments made in this article are a blueprint for change. To achieve
popular legitimacy, the police need to act fairly. While some of this can

134-51 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2014).
Compstat is an accountability program initially developed by the New York Police
Department (NYPD).
6

Garry

F.

McCarthy

&

Dennis

P.

Rosenbaum,

From
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to

RespectStat:

Accountability for Respectful Policing, POLICE CHIEF at 76-78 (Aug. 2015).
1
Ben Bradford & Ian Loader, Police, Crime and Order: The Case of Stop and Search, in THE
SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL POLICING (Ben Bradford, Beatrice Jauregui, Ian Loader & Jonny
Steinberg eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 27).
58

See, e.g., Stop and Frisk Data, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/

content/stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/PKC6-3WVGI (noting that "[n]early nine out of 10
stopped-and-frisked New Yorkers have been completely innocent, according to the NYPD's own
reports").
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involve more superficial issues such as politeness and courtesy, it also
involves allowing people to actively participate in making decisions
about what the policies and practices of the police will be.
Consequently, it is hard to build a system of legitimate policing on top
of an unjust social system. Even allowing for the possibility of false
consciousness with people accepting fair process in place of objective
fairness, an attractive feature of a procedural justice model is the focus
on what the public thinks about how the police behave, not the manner
in which the police evaluate their own conduct or define their own
preferred priorities. One argument for fear and intimidation is that it is
the only strategy available to police officers who are acting in the role of
enforcing oppression. A key question for the future is whether the
police can, in fact, utilize procedural justice-based strategies, and
recognize community participation and acceptance as a necessary part
of and "cost" of pursing such a strategy.
The police of Ferguson, Missouri provide a recent and salient
example of this problem. Investigation of that police force reveals that
it depends heavily upon the model of indenturing the population
through warrants and fines.5 9 If the population of that community had
a real voice in determining the policies and practices of their local
police department, they likely would not assent to a model of policing
through which their community financed its budget using a system of
widespread pretextual arrests, whose goal was to generate revenue
through fines and the long-term use of failures to pay fines to generate
further financial resources. Hence, this is an example of a system that
is likely to only be possible through a model of coercion and
intimidation. The more general question is how widespread conditions
of this type are throughout the United States. Of course, this line of
argument assumes that people are fully aware of how the system
operates and would not voluntarily assent to the current system. In
reality, many people may not be aware of the system-level dynamics
underlying policing and the operation of the courts in their community.
Further, studies make clear that people are motivated to justify the
60
status quo, even when it disadvantages them.
To the extent that widespread searches are designed to be a tool of
crime control because they communicate the risk of being caught when

' Michael Martinez et al., Policing for Profit: How Ferguson's Fines Violated Rights of
African-Americans, CNN (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/06/us/ferguson-missouriracism-tickets-fines/ [https://perma.cc/3SV4-PLJDI.
" See generally John T. Jost, Resistance to Change: A Social Psychological Perspective, 82
SOC. RES.: AN INT'L Q., 607 (2015); see generally John J. Jost et al., "The World Isn't Fair" A
System Justification Perspective on Social Stratification and Inequality in APA HANDBOOK OF
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VOL. 2. GROUP PROCESSES (J. F. Dovidio & J.A. Simpson

eds., 2015).
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engaged in wrongdoing, they are not effective since research suggests
that stops do not lead to higher estimates of the risk of being caught
when involved in ongoing criminal activity. 6 1 In addition, stops do not
lower the rate of criminal participation. 6 2 These actions are not
achieving crime control objectives because they are, at best, weakly
raising the perceived risk of criminal activity. If these actions are a
general intimidation strategy, it is not clear what metric would reflect
the success of that strategy if it is not increasing risk estimates or
lowering the rate of crime.
The first important point is that the police need to change their
style of policing if they are to build legitimacy. They need to focus on
building a consensual relationship with people in the communities they
police. Consequently, they need to think of each experience that people
have with the police as a learning moment during which people gain
information about the law and the nature of legal authority. The people
in the community might experience trust and reassurance or they
might experience fear. The police need to focus on the image of the
police as public guardians to be trusted and supported, and the police
need to treat the public in ways that support that model of policing.
Emphasizing legitimacy-based policing facilitates a broad vision of
the future role of the police. Local governments are generally
retrenching with diminished budgets and declining services. 63 But the
future of American communities depends upon social cohesion and
economic development. The police can serve a crucial role in this effort
at economic and social development, if the police project reassurance
and not fear. As will be noted below, the type of reassurance that is
especially related to trust is demonstrating concern for community
priorities and communicating that when people deal with the police
they will receive fair and respectful treatment. This reassurance
promotes social and economic development. 64 People are more willing to
work in the community, shop, take in entertainment, or otherwise do
the types of things that in the long run promote community well-being
and lead to the availability of jobs. If we have a police force, that force
can develop a style of policing that is not directed only at controlling
crime. It can focus more directly upon policing strategies that lead
people to feel reassurance, because they believe they will be treated
fairly and helped by the police when they call upon them for aid or

6

r

Tyler et al., supra note 21, at 628-29.

Tyler et al., supra note 17, at 774.
Thomas P. DiNapoli, New Fiscal Realities Challenge Local Governments, OFF. OF THE N.Y.

STATE COMPTROLLER, DIV. OF LOCAL GOv'T AND SCH. ACCOUNTABILITY 5 (Aug. 2012).
64

Tyler & Jackson, supra note 20, at 80, 89.
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when they are stopped by the police in their cars or on the street and
consequently create the conditions for economic development.
From a policy perspective, a question to ask is how to spend money.
If we have a dollar should we hire a police officer, build a prison, or do
something else? The recent review of deterrence literature by Chalfin
and McCrary finds strong evidence that crime declines when potential
criminals have "attractive legitimate labor market opportunities."6 5
Money invested in economic and social development in a community
pays a higher dividend than money invested in police or prison
(although both can have an impact on the rate of crime). 66 While this
may be true, my impression is that the political pressure to keep or
maintain levels of police is considerable. In spite of the striking declines
in the crime rate, police departments are not reducing their forces. 67 It
may not be realistic to expect resources to be redirected away from the
police and the legal system toward community development. Hence, it
is desirable for the police to become an organization that supports
community development.
III. THE SCOPE OF POLICING
Recent changes in police strategies have led to two types of
changes in the connection between people and the police. The police
have increasingly sought to prevent crimes. To do so they have
proactively intervened into the lives of ever larger groups of the
population, seeking evidence of ongoing criminal activity. If the police
stop and search one hundred people on the street and find one gun,
they have viewed this as a success because they have gotten one gun off
the street. However, they have also intervened into the lives of ninetynine innocent people, communicating suspicion and a presumption of
criminality to those people. In this section I consider how this
expansion has occurred; and how it has influenced the communities
involved.
A.

Mechanisms for Expansion

The second important development in policing since the 1960-70s
has been a change in the perceived mission of the police among the
police, the public and political leaders. An important change in
" Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature 26-30
(May 9, 2014) (working paper) (available from University of California at Berkeley) (on file with
The University of ChicagoLegal Forum).
6 Id.
67 Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 2008, 2011 U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS 3 (explaining the increase of police forces due to the
increase in population).
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philosophy that has expanded the scope of police contact with the
public has been to move away from a reactive stance in which the police
view their job as being to deal with ongoing crimes and/or to investigate
already committed crimes, and instead move towards trying to prevent
crime from occurring. Historically, police departments were tasked with
ensuring that criminals were held to account for their actions and
received punishment, thus ensuring post-event justice for victims. In
response to widespread public concerns about crime, the police became
increasingly involved in proactive policing. This effort to prevent future
crime fundamentally changed the goals and practices of the police. 68
1. Broken windows.6 9
The consequence of this change is that the police have been
motivated to act in advance of crime. An early framework for
understanding this transformation in policing is contained within the
highly influential article Broken Windows 70 and several other similar
pieces with the same theme.7 1 These articles made a number of key
arguments regarding crime. First, public fears about crime were driven
by evidence of low level crimes, which can be called community
"disorder." 72 As the authors summarize: "to judge from their behavior
and their remarks to interviewers, [people] apparently assign a high
valife to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police
help them maintain that order."7 3 Public fear is driven by widespread
minor lifestyle crimes, rather than more serious but less frequent
violent crimes. 74 Thus responding to the public desire for order means
addressing lifestyle crimes and community deviants (e.g. prostitutes,
drunks, etc.).
Second, the broken windows model suggests that such low level
disorder motivates later more serious crimes. The theory posits that
signs of decline and disorder-whether piles of trash, graffiti, or
beggars on the street-encourage more serious crimes in the future,
since disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked in a kind of

Sklansky, supra note 35.
This section relies heavily on work Jonathan Jackson, Avital Mentovich, and I published.
See Tom R. Tyler et al., supra note 21, at 606-07.
70 See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March
1982, at 29.
71 See James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on
Crime, 12 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 367 (1978).
6

69

72

Wilson & Kelling, supra note 70, at 31.

73

id.

74
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developmental sequence.7 5 A fundamental goal of law enforcement
must be creating perceptions that the authorities care about public
order and engage in efforts to control it by dealing with the petty
crimes which are central to community concerns.
These arguments led to a strategy for proactive crime control,
where the police targeted minor lifestyle crimes before those conditions
could lead people to engage in more serious crimes. The broken
windows model was supported by research conducted at that time on
the gains resulting from proactive policing,76 as well as by the results of
psychological experiments.7 7 The broken windows theory has shaped
policing models for the last thirty years. For example, in 2014,
Commissioner Bill Bratton "endorsed this model and stated it still
shapes his policies for the [New York Police Department]. "78
The broken windows model brings the police into more frequent
non-voluntary contact with the public. In those contacts, the police are
rule enforcers who bring the possibility of arrest or other sanctions as
an implied context for their interactions with people on the street or in
cars. It is not just more frequent contact that matters. When people are
committing minor crimes, a further issue is whether the police use
their discretion and just warn or admonish them as opposed to citing,
arresting or incarcerating those individuals. The key argument of
broken windows is that the police should draw these people into the
formal criminal justice system rather than treating their minor crimes
informally.
2. Zero tolerance policing.79
An early extension of the broken windows model in New York City
was the idea of zero tolerance policing.8 0 The police engaged in more
widespread arrests for minor crimes-for example, vandalism, public
intoxication, marijuana possession, public urination, or even drinking
beer on one's front steps. This policy has been described by police
leaders as based upon the "broken windows" theory because the people

Wilson & Kelling, supra note 70, at 32-33.
Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: "Hot
Spots" Patrol in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673, 684 (1995).
"
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City
and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 280-81 (2006) (explaining Zimbardo's
1969 car experiment); Kees Keizer et al., The Spreading of Disorder, 332 SCIENCE 1681, 1684
(2008).
7 Tyler et al., supra note 21, at 607.
7
This section relies heavily on work Jonathan Jackson, Avital Mentovich, and I published.
See Tom R. Tyler et al., supra note 21, at 607-08.
7
7

8
ANDREA MCARDLE & TANYA ERZEN, ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW
POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY 4, 19-24 (2001).
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targeted were committing crimes that typically had been ignored by
many traditional police officers or responded to with an informal
warning.8 1 The underlying model was that widespread arrests for such
minor crimes would deter later major crimes. For most such arrests,
people would spend a brief time in jail, sometimes pay a fine, and often
end up with a criminal record. 82
While based upon the premises of the broken windows theory,
''zero-tolerance practices expanded beyond one of the important
underlying ideas of the original broken windows model. In the original
model the police were directed to focus on those individuals whose
behavior was viewed by the community as outside of the widely agreed
upon rules of everyday social order (i.e. outside the communities'
shared normative consensus about appropriate behavior). In other
words, the original model "reflected the norms of the general
community,"
which included
disapproval
of "disreputable or
obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts,
rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, and the mentally disturbed." 83
The expansion of zero-tolerance policing increasingly led the police
to draw an ever bigger segment of the people in the community into the
criminal justice system for minor lifestyle crimes, rather than primarily
dealing with a small group of outsiders or "marginal" people. 84 Drawing
people into the system involves arrest, which is a ceremony of
degradation that changes a free person into a criminal defendant, with
all the attendant social meanings, physical discomforts, and civil
burdens.8 5 Instead of feeling that they are within the law-abiding
community and condemning some smaller groups of socially marginal
"deviants," a larger group of residents found themselves being excluded
from the category of "decent people" and socially marginalized by the
police. 86 Because the original goal of the broken windows model was to
show police responsiveness the targets of police action were a small
group of people that most others in the community would view as
acting inappropriately. However, the goal was to build support from the
larger community rather than causing people in the community to more
broadly feel that the police suspect them of misconduct and are
targeting them for criminal sanctioning.

8

Id.

Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control without Conviction, 119 AM. J. Soc.
351, 386 (2013).
8

83Id.

Plant & Scott, supra note 33, at 35.
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 82, at 374.
Id. at 388; Charis E. Kubrin et al., ProactivePolicing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities,
48 CRIMINOLOGY 57 (2010).
'
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3. Stop, question, and frisk.
Most recently, the police in some major cities have dropped any
pretext that the people they stop are engaged in illegal behavior; the
New York Police Department (NYPD) practice of stopping, questioning
and frisking large numbers of citizens in search of drugs and guns is an
example. The police have widely screened people on the streets,
particularly young people and minority group members. These stops
have not been predicated upon any reasonable suspicion of ongoing
criminal activity and are often referred to as pretextual stops, because
the reasons given are merely pretexts for stops motivated by the goal of
widespread searches of innocent people.87 Almost everyone stopped is
not involved in any criminal activity (for example carrying a gun or
drugs).8 8 For hundreds of thousands of residents and visitors in New
York City being questioned by the police has been a common occurrence
in New York City and other major cities. This has been particularly
true for young men of color.8 9 This policy expanded the scope of
proactive policing by including people who were not committing any
crimes or even engaged in overtly suspicious behavior.
The scope of these aggressive and proactive street stop programs
was large. In New York, these policies have produced more than 4.4
million involuntary contacts between the police and members of the
public between 2004 and 2012,90 most with the members of minority
groups, almost none of whom were carrying weapons or serious drugs.
Of these contacts, about one in nine resulted in an arrest or a citation,
and about one in five appear to fall short of constitutional grounds of
legal sufficiency.9 1 This policy of widespread stops is a clear example of
the police dealing with large groups of the general public from a
posture that communicates suspicion and leads people to feel that the
police mistrust them and think they may be engaged in criminal
activity; stopping, questioning, and frisking people who are simply on
the street.
As a consequence of these changes in the scope of the police stops
in the community, the police have communicated to a broader group of
people and in increasingly clear terms that they are individuals of
suspect character and presumed criminal tendencies. Not surprisingly,

7 Stop and Frisk in Chicago, 2015 ACLU OF CHI. 7 (Mar. 2015) http://www.aclu-il.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/ACLUStopandFrisk_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YY7-TFJB].

"

Stop-and-Frisk, NEW YORK CIviL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-

frisk-data [https://perma.cclUPN2-XPXK]; Delores Jones-Brown, Stop, Question & Frisk Policing
Practicesin New York City: A Primer, 2010 CENTER ON RACE, CRIME AND JUST. 10.
8 Fratello et al., supra note 46, at 30.
" Tyler et al., supra note 17, at 752.
91 Id.
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this has undermined trust in the police, even among those people who
gave the police the benefit of the doubt when initially stopped. This
change in the scope of policing has exacerbated the problems with
policing style that have already been outlined.
B.

Reasons for the Expansion

Why has this inexorable expansion of policing occurred? While
deterrence can be effective and studies do link the level of police
presence to the rate of crime, the effects of deterrence are often weak
and frequently limited by the availability of surveillance capacity.
Hence, when the police embark on a style of policing that relies on
perceived risk, the impact of police is limited. This is particularly true
when the police engage in broad-rather than focused-strategies for
policing. This reflects the cascade effects of coercive strategies. These
strategies reliably produce immediate compliance when officers are
present, so they seem desirable. However, they are difficult to sustain,
especially because they undermine other motivations for compliance,
such as legitimacy. 92 Since the police feel responsible for controlling
crime, they slowly move toward broader and less justified stops as a
long-term consequence of managing crime through fear of sanctions.
They expand the range and lower the justification needed for street
stops.
The slippery slope of investigatory stops has been highlighted by
several recent studies of policing. Research shows that people
distinguish investigatory stops from traffic stops and react to the
perceived illegality and injustice of repeated investigatory stops. 93 In

contrast, members of the public believe that they can control traffic
stops, because they can obey the law. Obeying the law is not a bar
against investigatory stops, which people view as outside their control
since being law abiding does not prevent being stopped by the police.
Similarly, research on contacts in New York City found that repeated
street stops undermined the likelihood that a young person would view
a subsequent stop as legal and procedurally fair. 94 Hence, a practice of
widespread and repeated stops undermines the good faith that many
police initially enjoy, i.e. the presumption that they have good faith
motives when dealing with the community.

12
1
94

Tyler, Legitimacy and CriminalJustice, supra note 36, at 309-11.
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Fruits of the Expansion

C.

Ironically, at the same time as the police have increased the range
of the people that they stop, the justification for doing so has become
less tenable. Studies show that even in high crime communities, most
people do not commit crimes. 95 Hot spots policing research shows that
even in high crime neighborhoods, most geographical areas are not high
violence areas. 96 Further, there are tactics for identifying high-risk
offenders (network analysis)97 and high-risk areas (hot spots policing). 98
This leads to an argument for focused deterrence. 99 That approach
focuses upon high-risk people and high-risk places. These research
findings suggest the desirability of focused deterrence.1 00
The police can identify the small set of places and people
responsible for the majority of violent crime, and they can direct their
attention to those places. Rather than treating all the people in a
neighborhood, even in a high crime neighborhood, as potential
criminals the police should seek to differentiate. This will allow them to
pursue cooperative legitimacy based self-regulatory approaches toward
almost everyone in any community.
A still unresolved issue is how to address the smaller group of
violent offenders. Some models suggest a sanction-based approach. 10 1
While a directed sanction-based approach toward this small group is
preferable to broad deterrence-based models, it is important not to
ignore evidence that even people with a history of violent crime are still
responsive to procedural justice and still act based upon legitimacy. 102
The second important change in policing is to focus investigatory
stops on a small but identifiable set of people and locations. This
change in general policing is consistent with the focus on hot spots that
is already occurring within some police departments. The police should
95 See generally Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Tragic, but not Random: The Social Contagion
of Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries, 125 SOC. SCI. & MED. 139 (2015).
96
See generally Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police
Patrol in Crime "Hot Spots' A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995).
9
See generally id.
98 See generally David Weisburd & Lorraine Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City
Drug Market Analysis Experiment, 12 JUST. Q. 711 (1995) (arguing that law enforcement is more
effective reducing crime when focused on specific hot spots, instead of larger areas).
" Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, Focused Deterrence and the Prevention of Violent
Gun Injuries: Practice, Theoretical Principles, and Scientific Evidence, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH
36, 56-58 (2015).
100

Id. at 65.

DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON'T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF
VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 207-31 (2011).
101
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minimize investigatory contact with the general population and focus
on responding to calls for service. In all stops the police should
emphasize providing justifications, explaining their policies, listening
to people, and being respectful and courteous. This could be described
as a return to Terry, i.e. to a high threshold for intervening in people's
lives that is related more directly to suspicion of ongoing crime. It is
more like the older view that the police should generally wait until
crime has occurred or is in the process of occurring to act upon
suspicions.
As noted, this sounds like an appeal for a return to the Terry v.
Ohio' 03 standard for police intrusion into people's lives. That standard
requires that there be specific and articulable factors suggesting that
"criminal activity may be afoot." 104 However, the discussion suggests
that even if these criteria are met, the police should consider avoiding
arrests when people's conduct is marginally illegal. Warnings about
lifestyle crimes and other ways of diverting people away from the
criminal justice system are generally desirable, especially when dealing
with young people. This does not mean ignoring crime. It means
emphasizing informal mechanisms for admonishing wrongdoers
whenever possible.
The argument is that the police should limit investigatory contact
with the public and in particular should avoid making minor arrests for
lifestyle crimes. This argument is the opposite of the broken windows
argument, where the police target lifestyle crimes. But broken windows
itself was originally conceived as focusing police efforts on a small
group of community deviants. The suggestion is particularly relevant to
police contacts with juveniles, which are a large proportion of police
contacts with the public. If the police recognize that ninety percent of
people, even in high crime communities, are unlikely to be involved in
violent crime, they can try to avoid drawing that group into the
criminal justice system.
The diversion argument is especially important for adolescents.
Many adolescents commit minor crimes. If left alone, they mature out
of crime. 0 5 However, if the police intervene and draw them into the
criminal justice system, their likelihood of maturing out of crime

103

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

" Id. at 21.
'
See Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-PersistentAntisocial Behavior:
A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993) (explaining that most adolescent
criminal behavior can be grouped into either life style persistent or adolescent limited and that
adolescent limited offenders are only engaging in criminality for social reasons, to fit in, and will
generally stop criminality when they are mature enough to see the long-term consequences of their
criminality).
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decreases. 106 Why? Because adolescents lack the adult capacities
needed to support law-abiding behavior. They pay too little attention to
long-term consequences, are too influenced by immediate rewards, and
find it hard to resist peers. 107 These are cognitive and neurological
limits-not character defects-so as their capacities develop, almost all
children mature into law-abiding adults.
In fact, adolescent mistakes have been recognized as a necessary
part of the growth process. Children are not born with an
understanding of what constitutes a reasonable risk and must acquire
it through experience. Taking risks that push (perhaps beyond) their
ability to reasonably control events is an inevitable and desirable part
of the process by which adolescents become adults. 108 Mistakes are
learning experiences and shape later actions. When the police
intervene, they have the general effect of decreasing the likelihood that
this normal evolution of effective risk calibration will occur as
adolescents move into adulthood because adolescents are drawn into
the world of criminality.
IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF POLICING

Finally, the police should focus authority dynamics within the
department. In particular, they should be concerned with whether
departments have procedural justice. Studies suggest that officers are
more willing to treat people with respect and courtesy, discuss issues
with them, explain their decisions, etc., if they experience the same
types of procedural justice from their superiors within the police
department. 109 Hence, what began as an effort to change how field
106
Anthony Petrosino, Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino & Sarah Guckenburg, Formal System
Processingof Juveniles: Effects on Delinquency, 2010 THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION 36 ("[Mlost
analyses showed that [juvenile justice] processing increased delinquency.").
10'

LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS

FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF

ADOLESCENCE 68-69, 92-100 (2014).
108
See Alexandra 0. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of
Developmental Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIENCES 63, 64 (2014); B. J.
Casey, Beyond Simple Models of Self-Control to Circuit-BasedAccounts of Adolescent Behavior, 66
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 295, 302-04 (2015).
Ben Bradford et al., Why do 'the Law' Comply? Procedural Justice, Group Identification
109
and Officer Motivation in Police Organizations, 11 EuRO. J. CRIMINOLOGY 110, 126 (2014); Joseph
De Angelis & Aaron Kupchik, Ethnicity, Trust, and Acceptance of Authority Among Police Officers,
37 J. CRIM. JUST. 273, 279 (2009).; Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed, and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule
Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 L. & Soc'Y REV. 457, 479-81 (2007); Suzanne J.
Farmer et al., Becoming an Undercover Police Officer: A Note on Fairness Perceptions, Behavior,
and Attitudes, 24 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 373, 383-84 (2003); Christopher J. Harris & Robert
E. Worden, The Effects of Sanctions on Police Misconduct, 60 CRIME AND DELINQ. 1258, 1280-81
(2014); Faye S. Taxman & Jill A. Gordon, Do Fairness and Equity Matter? An Examination of
OrganizationalJustice Among Correctional Officers in Adult Prisons, 36 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV.
695, 705-07 (2009); Scott E. Wolfe & Alex R. Piquero, Organizational Justice and Police
Misconduct, 38 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 332, 346-49 (2011).
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officers behave when dealing with the public has become a discussion
about how police leaders treat their own officers. Studies show that
when police officers feel fairly treated, they are more likely to regard
their department, its policies, and its leaders, as legitimate and to
follow with organizational rules and policies; to feel a commitment to
the goals of their department; to want to stay within the department;
and to be motivated to work cooperatively with their supervisors. 110
Typical of studies of police departments is a recent study of the
Chicago Police Department.' In that study, 786 patrol officers and
sergeants in a large urban police force completed surveys assessing
their perceptions of their department, the communities they police,
their views on different policing styles, and their well-being. The
findings of this examination of the internal dynamics of the Chicago
Police Department indicate that when officers were in a department in
which they rate the policies and practices of their superiors as being
procedurally fair, they were more likely to trust and feel obligated to
obey their supervisors; less likely to be psychologically and emotionally
distressed; less likely to be cynical and mistrustful about the world in
general and the communities they police in particular. 112 From the
perspective of this analysis it is especially important that these effects
were associated with a stronger endorsement of democratic forms of
policing, with less reported use of force, with increased organizational
efficiency, and with officer well-being. 113 These findings reinforce the
value of building procedural justice into the internal working climate of
police departments as a means to improve police officer job
performance, their well-being, and their relationship with the
communities they police.1 1 4

The final suggestion is that police departments need to focus on
fundamental changes in their own organization. They need to move
away from being quasi-military organizations and move toward
becoming more democratic in their internal processes. There are
several reasons for departments to do so. First, those democratic
practices shape interactions with the public and lead to greater police
legitimacy. Second, officers are more likely to themselves view the
policies and practices of their organization as legitimate and engage
with their superiors, resulting in desirable discretionary behavior.

"0 Tom R. Tyler et al., supra note 3, at 97.
.. Rick Trinkner et al., Justice from Within: The Relations Between a Procedurally Just
OrganizationalClimate and Police OrganizationalEfficiency, Endorsement of Democratic Policing,
and Officer Well-Being, 22 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y AND L. 158-72 (2016).
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Finally, officers themselves have a less stressful work environment and
have better physical and mental health.
V. TAKE-AWAY: CHANGING POLICING

The Police and Crime Control

A.

The current focus on the popular legitimacy of the police provides
an opportunity to shift American policing toward a model of consentbased policing in which people take on a stronger self-regulatory role
based upon their belief that the police are legitimate authorities who
ought to be supported and accepted in the community as the primary
agents of social control. To make that shift work, the police need to
adopt a new style of policing based upon the principles of procedural
justice. This would lead them to evaluate all of their dealings with the
community in terms of the impact of those contacts upon public trust
and confidence in the police. Further, the police should design their
policies and practices in similar terms. They should implement and
promote policies, such as community engagement, in designing policing
policies that lead to heightened trust.
The research reviewed demonstrates that the police have a lot to
gain by adopting this model of policing. 115 First, their actions will be
more widely accepted by people in the community and resistance and
anger over police interventions into people's lives will diminish. Second,
people will be less likely to engage in criminal activity and more likely
to help the police in their efforts to combat crime and disorder. This
more cooperative stance on the part of the public will facilitate effective
policing efforts.
This review suggests that a general effort to change the style of
policing from a "warrior" model to a "guardian" model as advocated by
the President'sTask Force on 21st Century Policing does not undermine
evidence about what works in fighting crime.1 16 General strategies of
widespread stops undermine trust; they are also not the most effective
approaches to fighting violent crime. Focused models better utilize
police resources by targeting places and people.
Their use minimizes the investigatory contact that police have with
the general public. Research findings support focused stops because: (1)
in high crime areas most of the people in the community are not
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engaged in criminal conduct, 117 and (2) virtually all adolescents mature
out of crime if they are not drawn into the criminal justice system.1 18
Finally, research makes clear that police reform must also involve
efforts to change the nature of police departments.1 19 Ironically, field
officers are found to be very similar to members of the community.
Their cooperation is based upon experiencing fair treatment from
authorities. In this case the authorities are their superiors. Legitimacy
functions in similar ways in both settings: the authority changes. To
build consent-based policing within communities, it is necessary to
build legitimacy within police departments.
B.

Refocusing Police Efforts: The Police and Community Development

Beyond combating crime, can police play a role in individual and
community development and flourishing? While a proactive suspicionbased model seeking to prevent crime is bad, a proactive conception of
the police based upon the forward-looking ability to anticipate
community problems and act in advance to prevent them is desirable.
The police can be part of an effort to build communities that develop
socially, economically and politically. The key to doing so is to create
conditions that facilitate people's engagement
in their own
communities. There is no question that law, one of government's
primary mechanisms for shaping society, has increasingly been called
upon to adopt a more proactive and intrusive role in modern society.
But that role has been defined in terms of crime control. Can that role
be defined instead in terms of supporting the empowerment and
engagement of people in the community, and through that process,
facilitating economic and social development?
How should we evaluate the potential impact of proactive policing?
The model that argues that the police can proactively build legitimacy
through efforts to promote safety by lowering crime suggests that police
actions are justified to the community if they manage societal threats
like crime. This model further argues that widespread proactive police
contact with a broad swath of people in the community both identifies
ongoing crime and broadly communicates the risk of wrongdoing,
thereby lowering current and future crime. Yet, as has been noted,
studies of the results of police stops suggest that proactive police
contact seldom identify active "ongoing" crime, so the focus must be on
the communication of risk, which might deter future crimes. However,
as has been noted, stops do not increase risk perceptions.
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In contrast to the model outlined, research does support the
suggestion that building public trust in the police promotes compliance
with the law and cooperation with the police. 120 However, unlike
arguments linking support to the ability of the police to manage fear
and disorder, recent studies suggest that the key to legitimacy is fair
treatment. 121 Hence, policies and practices for obtaining this long-term
goal need to be rethought in the light of research on what the public
considers when evaluating the police.
These arguments are something that has already been noted
within the field of policing. Ever since the early discussions of policing
by Sir Robert Peel in London, it has been suggested that the police can
best do their jobs through gaining the support and cooperation of the
public. 122 The results of recent research support the value of popular
legitimacy and link it cooperation. These findings speak to a larger
legal debate over the psychological consequences of being singled out
and questioned by the police. In discussing the impact of such a stop,
Supreme Court justices have taken different views, as shown in United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte.123 This case involves people being "briefly"
detained for secondary screening during the course of a border stop
conducted on highways in the area of the U.S.-Mexican border. Justice
Powell speculated that such a minor inconvenience is not likely to be
"stigmatizing." 124 In contrast, Justice Brennan's dissent argued that it
would be an "affront to the dignity," especially among the members of
minority groups who have a history of discrimination in dealing with
law enforcement. 125 Furthermore, he contended that "for the arbitrarily
selected motorist who must suffer the delay and humiliation of
detention and interrogation, the experience can obviously be
upsetting." 126 Finally, "that deep resentment will be stirred by a sense
of unfair discrimination is not difficult to see." 12 7
This growth in predictive actions is not restricted to the police.
Rather, it reflects a general growth in the use of risk assessment in
criminal justice. For example, people are held in custody based upon
estimates of likely future dangerousness, and decisions such as
punishment and parole involve the use of risk estimates. This set of
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practices has been labeled "actuarial justice" and widely applied to
pretrial detention, prison sentences, sentence severity, and post-release
supervision. 128
Both through stops themselves and any subsequent processing, the
police are communicating a message on the risk of being caught.
Through these mechanisms, the police believe they are potentially
deterring wrongdoing. The risk is first of being stopped and searched
anytime when on the street or in a car. Secondarily, there is a fear of
suffering the costs of arrest and subsequent efforts to avoid
adjudication and a criminal record by demonstrating the ability to
repeatedly appear at the courthouse and otherwise not break laws. As
has been noted, research does not support the assumption that being
involved in these types of contacts leads people to increase their
estimates of the likelihood that they will be caught and punished for
future wrongdoing. 129 At best, policies involving street stops have a
modest effect in deterring crime, and that occurs primarily when they
are concentrated in high crime areas. 13 0
In contrast to any possible gains in terms of reducing crime is the
cost of communicating to a large group of the public that state
authorities are suspicious of their character and behavior. In these
stops, most people are innocent of any wrongdoing but must still
account for their actions to suspicious police officers. Even drawing
people into the system based upon the fact that they are engaging in
minor forms of criminal conduct communicates doubts about their
character that they are required to disprove by engaging in a
protracted series of interactions with the courts.
These feelings are dramatically illustrated by people's reactions to
tickets based on speed cameras. 13 1 Wells's interviews suggest that
people work to create and maintain a "respectable identity" through
which they view themselves as law-abiding members of the
community. 132 They assume that they will be "free from censure and
criminalisation" as they attempt to "carry out good-faith social
cooperation." 13 3 These are the good citizens whose concerns with social
order shape broken windows policing. The "law abiding" majority
supports the application of police sanctions to deviant and marginal
1" Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in
CriminalJustice, 1 ANN. REV. L. AND SOC. SCI. 397, 406-14 (2005).
129
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groups. Traffic offenses provide a context in which good people can
receive a camera-based ticket for speeding. Such a ticket was found in
interviews to be viewed as communicating a stigmatizing symbolic
meaning provoking a number of defensive efforts to distinguish oneself
from the class of "real criminals" that ought to be the focus of police
attention. 1 3 4

VI. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
What relevance do these arguments have for the future? The
argument here is that the findings outlined provide a cautionary tale
for evaluating the policies and practices of a rapidly emerging
surveillance state. That is a society in which legal authorities broadly
monitor the ongoing activity of people in the community. While the
specific tactic of stop, question and frisk may be diminishing, the
surveillance state is rapidly growing in many other forms. Surveillance
cameras are ubiquitous in public spaces and people have grown
accustomed to feeling that their behavior on the internet and on the
phone is monitored by the government. While particular police tactics
may be changing, the idea of proactive policing is more powerful than
ever. 135 People see many signs indicating that they are "suspects" in the
eyes of legal authorities. Ultimately, people in our democratic society
must decide how much discretion they want to give legal authorities to
engage in such suspicion-driven activities.
Of course, there are many forms of suspicion. One form is being
personally questioned by legal authorities under circumstances in
which you are doing nothing wrong. However, surveillance raises
several further issues. One is whether people have a choice, i.e.
whether they can control whether they are under surveillance. If you go
to an airport, you voluntarily accept the choice to be screened, and you
can avoid that screening by deciding not to fly. Studies indicate that on
the street, people do not feel free to decline to answer police questions
or to allow themselves or their car to be searched, so street stops are an
arena in which people lack perceived choice. Research suggests that
13 6
this is a central distinction between traffic and investigatory stops.
People believe they can prevent traffic stops by obeying the law, but
they feel that investigatory stops are beyond their control. Obeying the
law does not prevent street stops. Much of being suspected in street
stops is beyond personal control because it is linked to where a person
lives or their demographic characteristics.
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A second related dimension is active versus passive surveillance. A
particularly disturbing aspect of street stops is feeling that an ascribed
category membership (race, age, gender) leads the police to view you
with suspicion. 13 7 In contrast, street surveillance via cameras is passive
and nondiscretionary. It is because of this distinction that random
roadblocks are often advocated. Similarly, the fact that everyone goes
through
a
metal
detector
makes
Transportation
Security
Administration (TSA) screening more acceptable. No one stopped at a
random roadblock or who goes through a metal detector at an airport
is, at least in theory, stopped because of who they are or what they are
doing. 138 Hence, random stops do not communicate suspicion, while
targeted stops can. It is for this reason that there have been strong
objections to the secondary screening, which occurs at airport stops
based upon TSA profiles, but do not apply to overall screening of all
passengers.
The people who are subjected to secondary screening may feel
picked out of a crowd and may wonder why they are the subjects of
suspicion. It is that same sense of being treated as suspect by the police
and wondering why that figures in the Supreme Court discussion of
border stops which are conducted using "apparent ethnicity" as one
reason for choosing people for further screening. 139 As Wakslak and I
note in our discussion of racial profiling, when people are stopped by
the police they engage in an effort to identify the reasons for that
stop. 1 40 Those can include that they were breaking law and/or that they
are African American, female, or young. The reasons that they decide
are the causes for the stop shape how they interpret and react to police
behavior. 141 In the case of inferences about racial profiling the police
seldom give race as a reason for a stop when they deal with a person, so
believing that one is singled out due to race is an inference that people
may make based upon their past experience with the police, their
knowledge of what others experience in their neighborhood and/or how
the officers behave towards them.
Is a brief stop for unknown reasons stigmatizing and undermining
of the feelings of respect and inclusion that are central to legitimacy?
While legal guidelines typically require some objective criterion for
police action such as secondary screening, those subjected to such
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action are seldom told what those reasons are. 142 Often, those subjected
to additional police action consider the possibility that prejudice and
racism are involved when they are young, male or members of a
minority group. No police officer, border agent or TSA agent would ever
say to a person that they stopped, searched or questioned them because
they are Black, "terrorist appearing" or "apparently Mexican in
appearance." Such encounters are inherently ambiguous and in that
ambiguity lies the petri dish for incubating perceived bias and racism.
Finally, surveillance can be public or private. Much of the
discussion of surveillance over Muslim groups has involved secret
surveillance. 14 3 Monitoring of communications loses its intelligence
value when people know that their phone lines or e-mail accounts are
being monitored, so surveillance must be secret. On the other hand,
street stops and other practices such as airport screening or bag checks
in subways are public.
Separate from the proactive tactics of the police is their general
manner of behaving when dealing with the public. Recent policing has
taken on the trappings of an instrumental model based upon threats
and intimidation, in which the police project control and dominance in
situations and are perceived by the public as harassing and demeaning
the people they deal with. Hence, separately from the value of
broadened surveillance is the manner in which the community
experiences the police. Are the police reassuring or are they
threatening? Threats communicate mistrust, social marginality, and
exclusion. A person who feels that the police are to be feared and
avoided has internalized a view of themselves as a marginal member of
society who is unsure whether its rules and protections in reality apply
to him or her.
Further, compliance with the law or even cooperation in
maintaining social order is not the only concern. Although the
dominant focus of recent discussions about police stops has been on
their legality and effectiveness in suppressing crime, the post-Terry
decision literature on police stops also raises a distinct but important
concern about the impact of stops on people's well-being. 144
Legal Rights and Proactive Policing

A.

The Constitution is structured to protect the freedom of citizens
from the intrusion of government into their lives. The primary form of
such protection is the principle that any intrusion of legal authorities
142
143
14
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into people's lives must have a legal justification. Traditionally, such
justifications begin in one of two ways. The first is that there is
evidence of ongoing illegal behavior. In the case of the police, an
independent judicial agent, such as a judge, issues a warrant for a
search or seizure and typically evaluates such behavior. This principle
is modified when the police see suspicious activity suggesting that
crime is in the process of occurring-circumstances under which the
law allows for a brief stop, questioning and search activities (a "Terry
stop"). 145

Police also deal with the public when there is some evidence of
prior illegal conduct, i.e. a crime has occurred and the police are
seeking to identify the criminal(s). In this case, any involvement in the
police investigation or imposition of sanctions must flow through the
due process of law, reflecting again independent judicial judgments to
justify investigatory intrusions, and an adjudicatory process concerning
innocence or guilt prior to the further intrusions associated with
punishment.
The traditional legal framework fits a zero-tolerance model that
reacts to minor crimes. While the use of police resources to arrest minor
level offenders may or may not be a wise use of resources, it is legal
since those involved are in fact violating the law. However, it is also
striking that such cases infrequently receive any form of adjudication.
Most frequently, the cases are dropped, often after those charged have
some period of involvement in the court system. 14 6 As KohlerHausmann has documented, most of the current action involving
misdemeanor cases occurs during a pre-adjudicatory phase, which lacks
even the legal safeguards associated with plea-bargaining. 147
Furthermore, many people who experience brief inconvenience
when stopped and questioned by the police have little or no clear
remedy if they object to being treated as a suspicious person while
engaged in no illegal behavior in a public place. No mechanism exists
for questioning whether the police had any reasonable grounds for
reasonable suspicion unless someone is arrested. As noted above, even
then most cases never come before a judicial authority or in reality
have even the type of second-rate justice typically derided in plea
bargaining. The message communicated to people is that the system is
arbitrary, nontransparent, and basically indifferent to their side of the
story. This provides good reasons to become cynical about the law.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-10.
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJustice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
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Because of these changes in police practices due to changing
policing goals and the growth of the proactive model of policing, the
constitutional model is increasingly ill-suited for the contemporary
world of policing. Police policies and practices, as well as those of the
courts, are not designed with the goal of allowing people to clear their
names and establish their good character and innocence. On the
contrary, their suspect character is assumed from the beginning and
they have neither the opportunity to clarify that they are good citizens
or the procedural justice based feeling that at least they received some
fair adjudication of their responsibility for criminal conduct. In most
cases, a person's fate is linked to discretionary judgments by police
officers and prosecutors based upon vague and never clearly articulated
criterion. This is troubling in general and in particular because of
evidence that such vaguely made judgments are the most likely to be
governed by implicit biases.1 48
The key point is that the law and the actions of government
authorities carry a great deal of social meaning and being suspected of
or even arrested for minor crimes carries social and identity related
messages of great weight. 149 As a result "[t]he consequences for one's
moral, as well as social and economic, identity seen to result from the
enforcement of the criminal law against a mass activity, have been
shown to result in a reassertion . . . [by the individual of their] essential
law-abidingness and respectability."15 0 From this perspective, people
feel that traffic cameras are unfair because fines based upon them
"formalises the authorities' lack of interest in the context of the offence
and the offender." 15 1 In other words, such a ticket does not give people
the chance to negotiate their identity issues with a police officer or a
judge by telling those authorities that they are a good person and
thereby treats citizens with disrespect. Research findings suggest that
these feelings are not generally mitigated by the possibility of having a
day in court rather than paying a ticket, because most of the people
"speed ticketed" are guilty of the speeding offense and those people
would have no case in court. 152 Those who are guilty still object to their
impersonal treatment.
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In general, the growth of police technology has not been
accompanied by efforts to understand how it is changing policecommunity relations. As a consequence, at this time,
[1]ittle is also known about how technology undermines,
preserves, or enhances the nature of people's interactions with
police. Policing is a human service industry, and technology has
the capacity to dehumanize policing, to make it more actuarial
and impersonal.1 5 3
Traffic stops are a good example of the general point that most
people in any community are invested in the image of themselves as
"decent people" and typically identify a small deviant group as being
criminals. As it turns out, research supports this argument by showing
that even in high crime areas, the overwhelming proportion of the
population is generally not involved in crime, particularly violent or
drug related crime. People resist the application of the label of suspect
or law breaker when the police apply it and seek to negotiate their
connection to a more favorable identity. Repeated police investigatory
stops undermine this premise, and when they are of people who are not
committing crimes, the police undermine feelings of self-worth and good
character. The stops also undermine the legitimacy of the law and the
connection between people and the police.
In the situations outlined, traditional jurisprudence is inadequate
to manage the behavior of the police and the courts. Although the police
still frame their actions in a Terry-stop framework, in reality their low
hit rates make it hard to imagine that they are actually making stops
based upon "reasonable suspicion" of ongoing criminal conduct. For
example, in Floyd v. City of New York, 154 Judge Scheindlin noted very
low hit rates for gun seizures for NYPD street stops.15 5 The Floyd
decision illustrates the ability of the legal system to address at least the
racial disparity aspect of police behavior. But it does not address the
overall constitutionality of stopping, questioning and frisking people
who are not engaged in criminal conduct. Current police practices have
rendered the legal idea of "reasonable" suspicion irrelevant, since the
police are stopping people with little or no justification for their
conduct.
What is left as a basis for evaluating police conduct? This paper
argues that the focus should be upon the impact of police practices on

'" Edward R. Maguire, Police Organizationsand the Iron Cage of Rationality, in THE OXFORD
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the public's views about the legitimacy of the police. The broken
windows model of proactive policing argued that policing should seek to
build relationships with the community by being responsive to
community concerns and showing concern with addressing community
problems. However, at least in terms of legitimacy, the efforts that have
been made under the general rubric of "broken windows" to address
fear of crime and community disorder have not built a positive
relationship with the community nor increased popular legitimacy.
Crime has declined, but popular police legitimacy has not increased.15 6
Terrorism as the Frontier of the Surveillance State

B.

While street stops may be in decline, the arguments made here and
the findings outlined have broad implications for the increase of the
anti-terror surveillance state. Following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., officials
recognized a fear of terrorism similar to the fear of crime in the 1970s
and responded with similar proactive policies. Government officials
have explicitly adopted the proactive goal of preventing another
terrorist attack and are actively engaged in a variety of policies and
practices to achieve that objective.1 57 This is an example of aggressive
proactive policing broadly conceived. Unfortunately, its impact on later
terrorist acts is hard to assess. It is tempting to attribute the lack of
further serious terrorism on the success of this policy, but that would
be unjustified since such success could have many causes.
The larger issue is how such tactics shape the legitimacy of the
law. These tactics have involved interactions with many members of
the Muslim American community. As with street stops, this has led to
stories of humiliating experiences communicating social marginality
and disrespect. 15 8 This widespread pattern is revealed in research on
policing the Muslim community. 159 Such research further indicates that
the willingness of Muslim Americans to cooperate with the police in
reporting terror threats is heavily influenced by whether the members
of that community experience the police as responsive to their concerns,
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respectful of them and their community, and sincerely concerned with
their own and their communities' well-being. Broadly framed, these are
issues of fair treatment, and they are central to legitimacy and
cooperation. Hence, the same dynamics are involved as those identified
in discussions of policing against crime.
The war on terror has led to the further militarization of the police.
"[T]he most serious consequence of the rapid militarization of American
police forces . . . is the subtle evolution in the mentality of the 'men in
blue' from 'peace officer' to soldier." 160 "A primary imperative for
soldiers is to kill the enemy; but police have a very different mission
than the military." 161 This "war" mentality is reflected in the range and
variety of forms of surveillance, public and private, that have developed
in the police focus on the Muslim minority community.
C.

The Future Surveillance State

Local and federal level police forces, as well as related agencies,
seem to have ushered in a new general era of broad surveillance
associated with the idea of proactive prediction involving risk
assessments concerning future actions. 162 In the case of the police, the
law enforcement community is engaged in widespread geographical
locations using cameras and, in the near future, drones. Telephone calls
and internet communication are monitored. And, the police continue
with some unknown variety of public and covert efforts to engage in
proactive screening of the public as it goes about its everyday behavior.
Certainly, it must be acknowledged that there are threats in
society and proactive police efforts seek to address those threats. The
argument being made here is that there are also costs of such
approaches, and those costs are often understated or even totally
ignored. As suggested by the findings outlined, by enacting these
policies and practices, law enforcement communicates a general
attitude of suspicion and mistrust, which ultimately erodes the
relationship that the public has with the police at a time when the
police are increasingly being looked upon as agencies that should build
solidarity 63 and motivate identification with and engagement in
communities. 164
From this perspective, a particularly disturbing development is
that risk prediction is becoming broader in scope with risk predictions
'" Maguire, supra note 153, at 87 (quoting Arthur Rizer & Joseph Hartman, How the War on
Terror has Militarized the Police, ATLANTIC, 2011).
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used to set sentences, make parole decisions, determine post-prison
release supervisory conditions and even whether people will be
executed. 165 In particular, it has involved the imposition of sanctions
based upon anticipated actions, while traditional policing has focused
upon using risk prediction to shape who is stopped and questioned.
Whatever the benefits and problems of risk prediction are as a
guide to investigation, being punished based upon a model that does
not involve individual conduct further undermines the relationship
between people and the state. People do not feel listened to and
evaluated as individuals who have a chance to explain and justify their
actions prior to punishment, because they are not being punished for
something they have done. They are being sanctioned for something
they are predicted to do in the future.

15

Simon, supra note 128, at 414-17.

